JWT offensif
/SKILLMéthodologie d'attaque JWT pour les testeurs d'intrusion. Couvre la confusion d'algorithmes (alg:none, RS256→HS256), la force brute sur un secret HMAC faible, l'injection de paramètres « kid » (SQLi,
name: offensive-jwt
description: "JWT attack methodology for penetration testers. Covers algorithm confusion (alg:none, RS256→HS256), weak HMAC secret brute force, kid parameter injection (SQLi, path traversal), jku/x5u/jwk header injection, JWKS cache poisoning, JWS/JWE confusion, timing attacks, and mobile JWT storage extraction. Use when testing JWT-based authentication, hunting auth bypass via token manipulation, or evaluating JWT implementation security in web or mobile apps."
Overview
Comprehensive JWT attack checklist for offensive security engagements. Follow steps in order; apply each technique to the current target context and track which items have been completed.
Quick Reference: Misconfigurations to Check
- Algorithm set to
none— signature verification bypassed entirely - Algorithm switching between
RSAandHMAC(confusion attack) - Weak or guessable HMAC secret (brute-forceable)
kid,jku,jwk,x5uheader parameters accepted without validation- Expired or tampered tokens accepted by server
- Sensitive data stored unencrypted in payload
Useful tool: JWT Tool
Mechanisms
JWTs (RFC 7519) consist of three Base64URL-encoded parts: header.payload.signature.
Signing algorithms:
| Algorithm | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| HS256/384/512 | Symmetric HMAC | Shared secret; confusion target |
| RS256/384/512 | Asymmetric RSA | Public key can be misused as HMAC secret |
| ES256/384/512 | Asymmetric ECDSA | |
| PS256/384/512 | RSASSA-PSS | |
| EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) | Asymmetric | |
| none | Unsigned | Critically insecure |
Additional pitfalls:
- JWS/JWE confusion: server accepts encrypted token (JWE) where signed (JWS) is expected, or fails open on unexpected
typ/cty - JWKS retrieval: SSRF via
jku/x5u, insecure TLS, poisoned key caching,kidcollisions - Token binding (DPoP, mTLS): incorrectly implemented allows replay from other clients
Hunt: Identifying JWT Usage
- Check
Authorization: Bearer <token>headers in all requests - Look for cookies containing JWT structures (
eyJ...) - Examine browser local/session storage
- Decode the token at jwt.io or via BurpSuite JWT extension — inspect claims and header parameters
- Note any
kid,jku,jwk,x5ufields in the header — these are attack surfaces
Vulnerability Map
JWT Vulnerabilities
├── Algorithm Bypass
│ ├── alg:none attack
│ └── RS256→HS256 confusion (public key as HMAC secret)
├── Weak Secret Key → Brute force
├── kid Parameter Injection
│ ├── SQL injection via kid
│ └── Path traversal via kid
├── Header Injection
│ ├── jwk (inline fake key)
│ ├── jku/x5u (remote attacker-controlled JWKS)
│ └── JWKS cache poisoning
└── Missing / Broken Validation
├── No signature check
├── Expired tokens accepted
└── iss/aud/exp not validatedVulnerabilities
Algorithm Vulnerabilities
- alg:none — Some libraries disable signature validation when
algisnoneor a case variant (None,NONE,nOnE) - Algorithm Confusion (RS256→HS256) — Server uses RSA public key as HMAC secret when attacker switches
algto HS256; attacker re-signs token with the public key - **Key ID (
kid) Manipulation** — Exploitingkidto load wrong keys or inject file paths / SQL; enforce strict lookups
Signature Vulnerabilities
- Weak HMAC Secrets — Brute-forceable with dictionary or hashcat
- Missing Signature Validation — Token accepted without any verification
- Broken Validation — Implementation errors in signature checking logic
Implementation Issues
- Missing Claims Validation —
exp,nbf,aud,issnot verified - Insufficient Entropy — Predictable JWT IDs or tokens
- No Expiration — Tokens valid indefinitely
- Insecure Transport — Token sent over HTTP
- Debug Leakage — Detailed error messages expose implementation
Header Injection Attacks
- JWK Injection — Supply a custom attacker-controlled public key via the
jwkheader - JKU Manipulation — Point
jku(JWK Set URL) to attacker-controlled JWKS endpoint - x5u Misuse — Load untrusted X.509 key URL; exploit lax TLS validation or open redirects
- JWKS Cache Poisoning — Force caches to accept attacker keys via
kidcollisions or response header manipulation - **
critHeader Abuse** — Server ignores unknown critical parameters, enabling bypass
Information Disclosure
- Sensitive data (PII, credentials, session details) stored unencrypted in payload
- Internal service/backend information leaked via claims
Additional Attack Vectors
Mobile App JWT Storage
Android:
SharedPreferences: Check if world-readable; location/data/data/<package>/shared_prefs/- Keystore extraction: root device or exploit app
- Backup extraction:
adb backup -f backup.ab <package>(ifallowBackup=true) - Tools: Frida, objection, MobSF
iOS:
- Keychain: Check `kSecAttrAcces