Mobile offensif
/SKILLMéthodologie de tests d'intrusion pour les applications mobiles (Android et iOS). Couvre l'analyse statique (apktool/jadx pour Android, class-dump/Hopper/IDA pour iOS), l'instrumentation dynamique
name: offensive-mobile
description: "Mobile (Android + iOS) application penetration testing methodology. Covers static analysis (apktool/jadx for Android, class-dump/Hopper/IDA for iOS), dynamic instrumentation with Frida and Objection, SSL pinning bypass strategies, root/jailbreak detection bypass, deep-link / URL-scheme abuse, exported component attacks (Android activities, services, providers, receivers; iOS XPC, URL schemes, universal links), insecure data storage (SharedPrefs, KeyStore misuse, NSUserDefaults, Keychain ACL bypass), IPC / Intent redirection, WebView vulnerabilities (JavaScriptInterface, file:// access), Firebase/AWS/Azure misconfiguration leakage, mobile API testing, biometric/Face ID/Touch ID bypass, app-cloning and runtime patching, and mobile malware/RAT analysis primitives. Use for mobile pentest, bug bounty mobile triage, or app-store reconnaissance."
Mobile (Android + iOS) — Offensive Testing Methodology
Quick Workflow
- Static: pull the IPA/APK, decompile, dump resources/strings, identify endpoints
- Dynamic: install on rooted/jailbroken device, hook with Frida, intercept TLS
- Map exported attack surface: deep links, URL schemes, exported components
- Storage / Keystore audit: where do secrets live, what protects them
- API: every backend the app talks to is your scope — test like a web app
Lab Setup
Android
- Rooted device or Genymotion / Android Studio AVD with
userdebugbuild - Magisk for systemless root; LSPosed for hooks; Frida server matching device arch
- Burp / Mitmproxy with system-trusted CA via Magisk module (
MagiskTrustUserCerts)
iOS
- Jailbroken device (palera1n / checkra1n / Dopamine depending on iOS version)
- Frida + Objection + Filza + SSH via USB (iproxy 2222 22)
- Burp CA installed via Settings → General → Device Management → Certificate Trust Settings
Static Analysis
Android
# Decode resources + smali
apktool d app.apk -o app
# Decompile to Java
jadx -d app_src app.apk
# Manifest review
xmllint --format app/AndroidManifest.xml | less
# Look for: android:exported="true", intent-filters, custom permissions, debuggable, allowBackup, networkSecurityConfig# Secrets and endpoints
grep -rE '(https?://[a-z0-9.-]+|api[_-]?key|secret|token|firebase|amazonaws|appspot)' app_src/
grep -r "Log\.[dwief]" app_src/ # leftover debug logs
# Native libs
file app/lib/*/*.so
# RE in Ghidra/IDA; look for JNI_OnLoad and exported Java_* functionsiOS
# Pull IPA from device
frida-ios-dump -o app.ipa "com.vendor.app"
# Or via App Store via 3rd-party tools (Apple Configurator with paid acct, etc.)
unzip app.ipa
# Decrypt if needed (jailbroken device): bagbak / clutch
bagbak com.vendor.app
# Class dump
class-dump-dyld -H Payload/App.app/App -o headers/
# Or for Swift symbols, use Hopper / IDA
# Strings / endpoints
strings -a Payload/App.app/App | grep -E '(https?://|key|secret|api)'# Info.plist analysis
plutil -p Payload/App.app/Info.plist
# Look for: NSAppTransportSecurity exceptions, CFBundleURLTypes (URL schemes),
# associated-domains entitlements, UIFileSharingEnabled, ATS exemptionsDynamic Analysis & Frida
Common Hooks
// Bypass SSL pinning (Android — generic OkHttp/CertificatePinner/TrustManager)
Java.perform(() => {
const X509TrustManager = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager');
const TrustManagerFactory = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory');
// ... full bypass scripts: codeshare.frida.re/@pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-with-frida
});
// Bypass root detection
Java.perform(() => {
const File = Java.use('java.io.File');
File.exists.implementation = function () {
const path = this.getAbsolutePath();
if (path.includes('su') || path.includes('Magisk')) return false;
return this.exists();
};
});
// iOS — bypass jailbreak detection
const stat = Module.findExportByName(null, 'stat');
Interceptor.attach(stat, {
onEnter(args) {
const path = args[0].readUtf8String();
if (/Cydia|jailbreak|substrate|frida/i.test(path)) {
args[0] = Memory.allocUtf8String('/nonexistent');
}
}
});Objection (Frida-based shortcuts)
objection -g com.vendor.app explore
# Then inside:
android sslpinning disable
android root disable
android hooking list activities
android intent launch_activity com.vendor.app/.SecretActivity
ios sslpinning disable
ios jailbreak disable
ios keychain dumpSSL / TLS Interception
Android Network Security Config
App with <network-security-config> requiring its own pinned CA: edit res/xml/network_security_config.xml, repack:
apktool b app -o app-patched.apk
apksigner sign --ks debug.keystore app-patched.apkOr live-bypass with Frida (preferred — no recompile).
iOS ATS / Pinning
For pinning, use Frida hooks against SecTrustEvaluate* / NSURLSession delegate method